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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 11-2972 
_____________ 
 
ANTONIO MERCADO, JR., 
    Appellant 
 
v. 
 
*PATRICK R. DONAHOE, Postmaster General, U.S. Postal Service 
 
*(Pursuant to Rule 43(c), Fed. R. App. P.) 
 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(No. 1-09-cv-01146) 
District Judge:  Hon. Joseph H. Rodriguez 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
June 26, 2012 
____________ 
 
Before:  SLOVITER, CHAGARES, and JORDAN, Circuit Judges
 
. 
(Filed: June 28, 2012) 
____________ 
 
OPINION  
____________ 
 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge
 Antonio Mercado appeals the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor 
of the Postmaster General.  Mercado claims his termination as a Part-Time Flexible Sales 
. 
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Associate at the Atco, New Jersey, Post Office was discriminatory on the basis of his 
gender and national origin, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as 
amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq
I. 
.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm. 
 We write for the parties’ benefit and recite only the facts essential to our 
disposition.  Mercado, a Hispanic male, was hired by the Postal Service as a Part-Time 
Flexible Sales Associate assigned to the Atco Post Office on July 8, 2006.  As an initial 
hire, Mercado was subject to a 90-day probationary period.  His performance was 
evaluated at 30, 60, and 80 day intervals.  Mercado received a satisfactory rating in all six 
rating categories after 30 days, but received unsatisfactory scores in all six categories at 
the 60 and 80 day intervals.  On September 26, 2006, prior to the expiration of his 
probationary period, Mercado was terminated for unacceptable conduct in the workplace 
and unsatisfactory job performance.   
After exhausting his administrative remedies, he filed suit, alleging that his 
termination was discriminatory on the basis of his gender and national origin.  The 
District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Postmaster General.  The 
District Court found that Mercado had failed to establish a prima facie case of 
discrimination.  The District Court further found that, even assuming arguendo that 
Mercado had established a prima facie case of discrimination, the Postmaster General had 
articulated legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for Mercado’s termination and 
Mercado had failed to show those reasons were a pretext for unlawful discrimination.  
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Mercado filed a motion for reconsideration, which the District Court denied.  Mercado 
timely appealed.   
II. 
Mercado contends that the District Court erred in holding that he failed to 
establish a prima facie case of discrimination.1  Because Mercado proffers no direct 
evidence of discrimination, we analyze Mercado’s Title VII discrimination claims under 
the familiar framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 793 (1973).  
Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the employee bears the burden of establishing 
a prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence.  Sarullo v. U.S. Postal Service, 
352 F.3d 789, 797 (3d Cir. 2003).  To establish a prima face case, the plaintiff must show 
“(1) membership in a protected group; (2) qualification for the job in question; (3) an 
adverse employment action; and (4) circumstances that support an inference of 
discrimination.”  Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002); see also 
Goosby, 228 F.3d at 318-19 (holding that to establish a prima face case, the plaintiff must 
show he was “(1) a member of the protected class, (2) qualified for the position [he] 
sought, and (3) nonmembers of the protected class were treated more favorably.”).2  The 
prima facie case test “remains flexible and must be tailored to fit the specific context in 
which it is applied.”  Sarullo, 352 F.3d at 797-98.  “The central focus of the prima facie
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  This Court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review a grant of summary judgment de 
novo.  J.S. ex rel Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 925 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(en banc); Goosby v. Johnson & Johnson Med., Inc., 228 F.3d 313, 318 (3d Cir. 2000).   
 
2 The Postmaster General concedes for the purposes of this appeal that Mercado 
established that he is a member of the protected class and was qualified for the position of 
Part-Time Flexible Sales Associate.   
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case is always whether the employer is treating some people less favorably than others 
because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”  Id.
 The District Court found that Mercado failed to demonstrate a prima facie case 
because Ashley Hoak, a white, female casual employee at the Atco Post Office, whom 
Mercado alleged was treated more favorably than he, was not similarly situated to 
Mercado.  Mercado argues that the District Court erred in concluding that different 
workplace standards applied to probationary employees, but we do not agree the District 
Court so concluded.  Mercado also contends that the District Court erred in concluding 
that Mercado and Hoak were not similarly situated because she was not a probationary 
employee.  Mercado contends that preferences given to Hoak permit an inference of 
discrimination.   
 at 798 (quotation marks 
omitted).   
The District Court correctly determined that Hoak was hired as a casual employee, 
serving a 90-day dual appointment as a Rural Carrier Associate and a Temporary clerk.  
Hoak did not perform the same job functions as Mercado and her training differed from 
Mercado’s training.  For instance, Mercado did not deliver mail and Hoak did not 
perform any retail counter functions.  In addition, most of Hoak’s training was provided 
on the job, whereas Mercado received more formal training.  Hoak also was not a 
probationary employee during Mercado’s probationary period — she had completed her 
probationary period for her dual appointment before Mercado was hired.  Hoak 
eventually was hired as a Part-Time Flexible Clerk at the Atco Post Office, several 
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months after Mercado’s termination, and completed a 90-day probationary period for that 
position.  
 We agree with the District Court that Hoak was not sufficiently similar to 
Mercado to serve as a comparator and the circumstances otherwise do not support an 
inference of discrimination.  Thus, Mercado failed to present a prima facie case of 
discrimination.  Sarullo, 352 F.3d at 797-98; Goosby, 228 F.3d at 318-19; see also 
Blanding v. Pa. State Police, 12 F.3d 1303, 1309-10 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that tenured 
troopers were not similarly situated to a probationary trooper); accord Lee v. Kan. City S. 
Ry. Co., 574 F.3d 253, 259-61 (5th Cir. 2009) (applying factors such as whether 
comparators had the same job or responsibilities and same supervisor or decision-maker 
in analysis of whether comparator was sufficiently similar to make out a prima facie 
case); Pierce v. Commonw. Life Ins. Co.
 Accordingly, the District Court properly granted the Postmaster General summary 
judgment.    
, 40 F.3d 796, 802 (6th Cir. 1994) (requiring “all 
the relevant aspects of” plaintiff’s employment situation to be “nearly identical” to 
comparator in prima facie analysis).    
III. 
 Even assuming arguendo that Mercado had established a prima facie case of 
discrimination, the District Court correctly determined that the Postal Service articulated 
legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for Mercado’s termination.  Mercado was 
terminated for unacceptable conduct in the workplace and unsatisfactory work 
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performance.  The District Court found that Mercado failed to show these reasons were 
pretextual.  We agree.   
To show pretext, Mercado must submit evidence that would “allow a fact-finder 
reasonably to infer that each of the employer’s proffered non-discriminatory reasons was 
either a post hoc fabrication or otherwise did not actually motivate the employment 
action . . . .”  Doe v. C.A.R.S. Prot. Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 358, 370 (3d Cir. 2008).  
Mercado, as the non-moving plaintiff, “cannot simply show that the employer’s decision 
was wrong or mistaken” but instead “must demonstrate such weaknesses, 
implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s 
proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally 
find them unworthy of credence and hence infer that the employer did not act for [the 
asserted] non-discriminatory reasons.”  Fuentes v. Perskie
 Notwithstanding the fact that Mercado received unsatisfactory performance scores 
at 60 and 80 days of his probationary period, Mercado argues that the District Court erred 
because the Postal Service officials did not inform him of his conduct issues or 
performance deficiencies and the Postal Service failed to produce documentation to 
support its assessment of his conduct and performance during his probationary period.  
However, lack of notice or information about problems with performance does not 
constitute evidence of pretext.  
, 32 F.3d 759, 765 (3d Cir. 
1994) (quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis in original).   
Hague v. Thompson Distrib. Co., 436 F.3d 816, 827 (7th 
Cir. 2006).   
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Mercado also argues that the District Court made impermissible credibility 
determinations by crediting the Postal Service’s evidence.  We disagree.  The District 
Court correctly determined that Mercado disputed his supervisors’ perceptions of 
interpersonal conflict incidents, but not the occurrence of incidents themselves.  For 
instance, Mercado admitted to an argument with a senior mail processor assisting him 
with a mail sorting machine and to a conversation with a co-worker about reporting the 
incident that made the co-worker uncomfortable.  That same co-worker also reported to 
management another incident with Mercado that upset him.  Mercado acknowledged that 
he discussed proper attire with a supervisor, although he denied the supervisor’s version 
of the discussion that the supervisor informed him that he was dressed improperly.  
Mercado also admitted that his request for a schedule change resulted in an argument, 
although he disputed his supervisors’ descriptions of the incident.  Finally, Mercado 
admitted to a discussion about workload distributions and assignments with a supervisor, 
which his supervisor described as an argument.  The District Court also correctly noted 
that Mercado’s arguments about his supervisors’ descriptions of his work performance 
deficiencies constituted only general denials.   
In sum, the District Court properly held that Mercado failed to show that the 
Postal Service’s evidence of his interpersonal conflicts and performance deficiencies 
constituted a pretext for discrimination.  Billet v. CIGNA Corp., 940 F.2d 812, 825 (3d 
Cir. 1991) (“[The employee’s] view of his performance is not at issue; what matters is the 
perception of the decision maker.  The fact that an employee disagrees with an 
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employer’s evaluation of him does not prove pretext.” (citation omitted)), overruled in 
part on other grounds by St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks
Because we agree that Mercado failed to demonstrate that the Postal Service’s 
reasons for his termination were pretextual, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of 
summary judgment.  
, 509 U.S. 502 (1993). 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order granting 
summary judgment to the Postmaster General.   
